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Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Land Use
Planning
Joseph Sabino Mistick*
INTRODUCTION

The Contract with America' has produced hundreds of new
Republican office holders and has contributed to the shifting of
control in Congress, state legislatures, governors' mansions,
boards of county commissioners, and city halls. There is some
disagreement over whether the contract is a persuasive leadership tool or a media gimmick. One thing is certain, however, the
call for states' rights and a smaller federal government has hit a
resonant chord.
Followed to its natural conclusion, this trend should extend to
the municipal level where government is closest to the people. A
review of the latest developments in Pennsylvania land use law
indicates that the courts and legislature have gotten the message. Power is being restored to the local citizenry in a variety of
ways, all of which demonstrate an appreciation for local selfdetermination and for the difficulties facing entry-level public
servants. Specifically, local interest groups have been flexing
their muscles by using their zoning codes and procedures as
*

Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

1. The Contract with America was reprinted in the MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 30, 1994, at A20 [hereinafter Contract with America].
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sculptors' tools to shape their communities both physically and
socially. And the courts and legislature have been giving them
the go-ahead.
This overview of recent developments begins, in Part I, with
the sensationalized world of adult entertainment. Striptease
entertainment seemed to be of little concern to local governments in the 1980's, and more importantly, it seemed that little
could be done locally about this particular form of expression.
This year, however, hardly a day passes without some new report of a battle royale over a strip club. What's more, a recent
commonwealth court decision may encourage local regulators to
square off with the First Amendment.2
Part II of this article addresses historic preservation. The
United States Supreme Court has handed down a series of Takings Clause3 decisions indicating that individual ownership
rights must be afforded greater consideration-and that may
threaten the efforts of history buffs.4 The work of the agricultural preservationists may provide a framework for resolving this
conflict. Under the recently amended Agricultural Area Security
Law,' thousands of acres of Pennsylvania farmland have been
saved from developers. The success of this program may lie in
its emphasis on local review.
Part III deals with the power of local zoning boards. The Sunshine Act subjects boards to the scrutiny of the people they serve
and a recent common pleas court case reemphasized that the
power is in the hands of the people-in their hand-held video
cameras, that is.' At the same time, a recent commonwealth
court decision also recognized that the local citizens who serve
on these boards are entitled to protection from tort liability,
recognizing that if the lowest levels of government are going to
assume more responsibilities, they must be given the same
protections enjoyed by higher level government officials.7

2. See Township of Concord v. Concord Ranch, Inc., 664 A.2d 640 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995).
3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Penn Central Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-915 (1995).
6. See Malczyk v. Slocum Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 85 Luz. Reg. Rep.
207 (C.P. Luz. Cty. 1995).
7. See Delate v. Kolle, 667 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
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Part IV addresses local response to the growing cellular phone
industry. It would have seemed that a recent commonwealth
court decision would have eliminated much of the site-by-site
battling over the construction of cell phone towers, but the locals
have battled on. Much like the battles over group homes before
the Federal Fair Housing Act, 8 these towers are being considered one at a time, with the language of each local zoning code
being determinative. Unless the public will exists to preempt
local control in this area, municipalities will be able to stall the
development of a comprehensive telecommunication network
through the adoption of fairly primitive zoning amendments.
Finally, courts have indicated that the site specific relief afforded to developers that successfully challenge the constitutional validity of a municipal zoning code may not be automatic. The
validity challenge mechanism may be subject to additional scrutiny, with zoning boards getting one more opportunity to frustrate the goals of a successful challenger. A recent commonwealth court decision encourages local officials to search through
their zoning codes for a "silver bullet" provision that will stop
the development in its tracks.
I. IT'S 11:00 P.M.... Do You

KNOW WHERE YOUR HUSBAND IS?

TOWNSHIP OF CONCORD V. CONCORD RANCH, INC.

Neighbors of Indiana County's End Zone Club, which features
"flashing lights, thundering music and naked dancers," protested
the club with signs and placards that read: "Keep your clothes
on," "Satan tries again," and "Does your wife know you're
here?""0 Club owner Larry Nagle retorted that the club offers
"admiration of the human form in its purest sense." 1 Residents
were especially angered, however, because the Northern
Cambria County Community Development Corporation gave
Nagle a special deal on the property under the impression that
Nagle would open a "jobs-producing hardwoods plant" similar to
one he already owns in Jefferson County.'
Controversies over nude dance clubs have littered the headlines during the past year in what is perhaps the most visible
example of recently revived land use issues. In addition to the
controversy in Indiana County, legal battles have ensued over
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
9. See Tom Gibb, Rural Neighbors Rally Against Nude Dancing, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 1995, at A16.
10. Gibb, supra note 9, at A16.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Rostraver's Club Erotica,18 as well as Fantasy's Gentleman's
Club.14 But what have the courts said in response to
communities' increasing intolerance of these adult uses?
Concord Ranch
In Township of Concord v. Concord Ranch, Inc.,"5 Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court President Judge Collins offered a
glimpse of what can be expected from the commonwealth court
on these issues in an entertaining opinion that would have made
former Justice Musmanno proud. Concord Ranch, Inc. ("CRI")
operated the Longhorn Ranch, which was an entertainment
center featuring male and female dance reviews." In August of
1994, CRI began using the facility for topless female dancing. 7
The Township Zoning Officer advised CRI that the "ecdysial"
entertainment featured at the Longhorn Ranch violated a zoning
ordinance. 8 The notice issued to CRI explained that it had the
right to appeal to the Zoning Hearing Board within thirty
days." CRI ignored the notice, continued the topless entertainment, and failed to appeal to the Board.2"
On October 5, 1994, the common pleas court entered an in-

13. The Concerned Citizens of Rostraver planned "protests and other efforts"
to close down Club Erotica. Anti-Club Tactics Planned: Club Erotica is Citizen Target, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 1995, at D3. The Belle Vernon Ministerial
Association also conducted demonstrations. Ernie Hoffman, Officials Lose Bid to
Close Club, Rostraver Residents Cite Violations of Zoning, Obscenity Laws, PirrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1995, at B3.
14. Richard Marrone owned the building housing the nightclub. Jon Schmitz,
Building's Owner Sues Club, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 1995, at C1. He
sought an injunction against the operators of the club when they began staging nude
dancing. Id. Marrone argued that the activity violated the lease and the zoning
laws. Id.
15. 664 A.2d 640 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
16. Concord Ranch, 664 A.2d at 643. These reviews included the Chippendale
Male Dance Review and 'Las Vegas style" female dancers. Id.
17. Id. New management at CRI referred to the new use as a "gentlemen's
club." Id.
18. Id. at 643-44. Judge Collins referred to "male and female topless entertainment and/or striptease entertainment" as 'ecdysial entertainment." Id. at 643. Footnote 2 of the opinion explained:
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Webster's) defines the word
ecdysial to mean, "of, or relating to, or functioning in ecdysis." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 718 (1981). Ecdysis is defined as "the act of
molting or shedding an outer cuticular layer." Id. Cuticular is defined as "of or
relating to cuticle or cuticula." Id. at 561. A cuticle is commonly defined as
"an outermost layer." Id. Consequently, Webster's defines the term ecdysiast as
a "stripteaser." Id. at 718.
Id. at 644 n.2.
19. Id. at 644.
20. Id.
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junction that prohibited topless dancing on the premises.2 1 The
court concluded that CRI failed to comply with the enforcement
notice, failed to appeal, and intentionally expanded its non-conforming use without permission.22 CRI filed a demand for final
hearing under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(f)(1),
stating that the injunction restrained freedom of expression."
The common pleas court found that freedom of expression was
not involved, and instead, stated that nothing more than enforcement of the zoning ordinance was sought.'
On appeal, the commonwealth court held that because CRI
continued an unlawful use without appealing to the zoning
board, Section 616.1(c)(6) mandated a conclusive finding of a
violation, allowing the Township to seek an injunction under
Section 617.2.2"
The court's use of the term "ecdysial entertainment" in place
of the tired and shabby term "striptease," with which we are
most familiar, lended a loftier image to the activity in question.
It does not appear, however, that the court elevated this adult
use above the Municipal Planning Code (the "MPC") or local
land use regulation. We may never know whether the citation
issued by the zoning officer involved a legitimate violation because CRI failed to appeal as required by the MPC, and the
Township sought and received an injunction enforcing the cease
and desist order in common pleas court.
The commonwealth court found that the inaction by CRI re-

21.

Concord Ranch, 664 A-2d at 644.

22.

Id. The court also found that a 1982 agreement between the Township and

CRI was an ultra vires act because the board of supervisor's did not have the au-

thority to enter into an agreement under the Municipal Planning Code. Id. The
commonwealth court held this finding to be in error, however, because neither party
challenged its validity. Id. at 646.
23. Id. at 644. Rule 1531(f)(1) states:
When a preliminary or special injunction involving freedom of expression is issued, either without notice or after notice and hearing, the court shall hold a

final hearing within three (3) days after demand by the defendant. A final
decree shall be filed in the office of the prothonotary within the three (3) day

period, or if the final decree is not filed within twenty-four (24) hours after
the close of the hearing, the injunction shall be deemed dissolved.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1531(f)(1).
24. Concord Ranch, 664 A.2d at 644.
25. Id. at 646. Section 616.1(cX6) states that "failure to comply with the notice
within the time specified, unless extended by appeal to the zoning hearing beard,

constitutes a violation, with the possible sanctions clearly described." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 10616.1(cX6) (1988). Section 617.2, providing for enforcement

remedies,

states in relevant part: "If the defendant neither pays nor timely appeals the judgment, the municipality may enforce the judgment pursuant to the applicable rules of
civil procedure." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10617.2(a) (Supp. 1995). See also Township

of Maidencreek v. Stutzman, 642 A.2d 600 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
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sulted in a conclusive determination of a violation pursuant to
MPC Section 616.1(c)(6). 2 CRI then invoked the muse, claiming
that freedom of expression should not be frustrated by zoning
statutes and ordinances.27 To the surprise of CRI, the court rejected the claim that CRI was at least entitled to the safeguards
of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(f)(1), which requires a special expedited formula to a final decree in matters
involving freedom of expression.2 8
CRI sat on its rights by not appealing the zoning violation
citation, and, therefore, the court's message was clear that the
land use procedures mandated by the MPC and local ordinances
would not be trivialized, even by the First Amendment. Citing
Zimmerman v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,29 the court made
clear that using the claim of freedom of expression, as CRI did
in this case, is no more than an "end run" around the duly empowered legislative body.3"
Local regulators also received a boost to their ability to regulate adult uses in 1916 Delaware Tavern, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment.31 There, the court found that local municipalities
"are [not] precluded from exercising zoning controls over establishments thought by some to be potentially lewd and/or immoral" as long as the legislation is liquor neutral.32 This concept of
liquor neutrality flowed from the fact that the city ordinance at
issue in that case also dealt with non-licensed adult book stores
and theaters. This provision expressly permitted cabarets in certain areas, with no regard for whether the establishments were
licensed to serve liquor.

II. HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND FARMERS.
If you accept Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City3" as, ideologically, the left-most outpost in the battle over
non-consensual property takings in the last three decades, the
slow but inexorable swing towards the right has not gone unnoticed.' At times in the years following Penn Central, it has

26. Concord Ranch, 664 A.2d at 646.
27. Id. at 646-49.
28. Id. at 647.
29. 654 A.2d 1054 (Pa. 1995).
30. Concord Ranch, 664 A.2d at 648.
31. 657 A.2d 63 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
32. 1916 Delaware Tavern, 657 A-2d at 69.
33. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
34. For the text of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see supra
note 3. Many authors have noted that the Supreme Court has been placing more
emphasis on individual property rights. See, e.g., Chauncey L. Walker & Scott D.
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seemed that historic preservation is of such vital importance to
our nation that all other American notions of property rights
must bow in its presence. Historic preservation still occupies a
pedestal above the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment and it
has equaled in importance governmental actions rooted in the
physical safety of our citizenry. Observers of Penn Central's
thirty-year run, however, have seen the Supreme Court move
closer and closer to Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion,
which argued that the historic landmark designation was a
taking requiring compensation."
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles" ended a period of drought for the proponents of individual property rights by putting governments on notice that
they could expect to pay for temporary takings caused by illconceived legislative initiatives. 7 In this case, a public safety
goal was insufficient to spare the government from financial
responsibility for the time it took the property owner to successfully challenge the law.3"
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission39 reined-in regulators who took broad license with their statutory powers by attempting to control development aspects that were not the subject of the legislative authority under which they were operating.' With this case we acquired the nexus test, which now requires a connection between the thing that the government is
attempting to regulate and the purpose of the legislation under
which the individual would operate.41 The natural result must
be greater care in drafting and enforcing land use regulations.
A review of Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis42
is like "deja vu all over again."' Sixty-five years after PennsylAvitabile, Regulatory Takings, Historic Preservation and Property Rights Since Penn
Central: The Move Toward Greater Protection, 6 FORDHAM ENVrL. L.J. 819 (1995).
35. The Court had held that New York City's landmark designations were a
legitimate state interest that did not prevent a reasonable return on investment and
was therefore not a taking. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135. The Rehnquist dissent,
however, indicated that the landmark designations were a taking because they neither prohibited a nuisance nor offered a reciprocal benefit. Id. at 145-47 (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).
36.
37.

482 U.S. 304 (1987).
First English, 482 U.S. at 320. The First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church sought compensation for a "taking" when a temporary ordinance, designed to
respond to a flooding emergency, prevented any construction or reconstruction of its
destroyed buildings. Id. at 307.
38. Id. at 322.
39. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
40. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
41. Id.
42. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
43. This phrase has been attributed to Yogi Berra. See JOHN BARTLETr, FA-
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vania Coal Co. v. Mahon," the United States Supreme Court
considered another attempt to protect the owners of surface
rights from the sub-surface activities of the industry.' Finding
itself once again in the middle of two competing sets of property
rights, the Court sided with the individual rights of the masses
and set the stage for an as yet unscheduled rubber match.
With Dolan v. City of Tigard," the Court came close to trumpeting the right of a private property owner to be free from frivolous regulatory interference by government officials. This case
involved the owner of a hardware store who wanted to expand.47 The City would allow this expansion only if the property owner allowed a bikeway to be constructed along the rear
property line of the subject parcel." So far this is a scenario
familiar to zoning lawyers everywhere but there was a surprise
ending. Applying the Nollan nexus test, the Court gave rise to
the following question: Who goes shopping to the hardware store
on a bicycle?49 More importantly, it shifted the burden to prove
a connection between the bikeway and the hardware store to the
municipality."
All of this is really just background for a startling turn of
events in Pennsylvania. In 1991, in United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia("United Artists F),5 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that non-consensual takings for
historic preservation purposes are takings that require the payment of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 2 For
one brief shining moment, Pennsylvania had broken from the
pack and planted its flag in the land of individual property
rights. This was a break with national precedent that did not
last.
After much gnashing of teeth by preservationists and public
officials with limited budgets, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

MILIAR QUOTATIONS 754 (16th ed. 1992).
44. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
45. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474.
46. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
47. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313-14.
48. Id. at 2314.
49. Id. at 2321-22.
50. Id. (stating that the "city must make some effort to quantify its findings
in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway.").
51. 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991).

52. United Artists 1, 595 A-2d at 7 (stating "that by designating the theater
building as historic, over the objections of the owner, the City of Philadelphia
through its Historical Commission has taken the appellee's property for public use
without just compensation in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution.").
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granted reargument and handed down United Artists Theater
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia ("United Artists IF,)."3 Just
as suddenly as developers and property owners were freed from
the bonds of preservation, they once again found their property
subject to the fanciful intentions of strangers. 4 Pennsylvania
found itself back in the pack.
United Artists I was, at the very least, a sign of the frustration that has been wrought from a situation in which individuals
can nominate someone else's property for historic designation
without a chance of the owner receiving compensation for any
diminution in value caused by the designation. At best, this process has saved some glorious physical examples of our heritage.
At worst, citizens' groups and preservation buffs have been encouraged to indulge in their hobbies at the expense of others. In
search of a solution to this dilemma, we need to look no further
than the treatment of our agricultural heritage in Pennsylvania.
The Agricultural Area Security Law5 provides a process and
funding for the purchase of agricultural conservation easements
by the Commonwealth.56 County boards entertain applications
from owners of farm land who wish to sell perpetual easements
that will assure that their land will not be available for any future development.5 7 Those recommendations are then considered by a state-wide seventeen member Agricultural Land Preservation Board. Most of the funding comes from a two-cent tax
on each pack of cigarettes.58 The land can be leased or sold after the sale of the easement but the limitation to agricultural
use remains in place. As a result of an amendment negotiated
by State Representative William R. Lloyd, Jr. of Somerset County, the state board adopted guidelines in 1995 that will emphasize the soil quality during the farm selection process. This
means that the "best" farms will be selected for preservation
instead of those facing the greatest likelihood of conversion.59
Piggybacking on a sin tax is an age-old strategy for funding
those programs that do not have sufficient support to secure a
53. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
54. United Artists 11, 635 A.2d at 620 (stating that "the designation of a privately owned building as historic without the consent of the owner is not a taking
under the Constitution of this Commonwealth.").
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-915.
56. Section 902 outlines the purpose of the Act. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§ 902.
57. The boards are enabled under § 904. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904.
58. Christopher Elser, Potential Changes in Farm Preservation May Hurt Local
Efforts, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Sept. 2, 1995 (1st ed.), at B9.
59. Telephone interview with William R. Lloyd, Jr., State Representative (Feb.
7, 1995).
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permanent place in state or local municipal budgets. A more
logical source for funding historic designation, in light of claims
that landmarks promote tourism, would be an additional levy on
airport departures or room taxes. The same process of county
nomination and state board selection would preserve local control without sacrificing the long view that can be provided by a
board with less emotional attachment to individual projects.
This procedure would not save every historic structure in the
Commonwealth, no more than the farm preservation mechanism
saves every worthy farm, but it would provide a sensible and affordable process on the heels of United Artists I & II and the
expected progeny of Dolan.
With "private property. rights" bills pending in Congress and
the Pennsylvania House and Senate that would require compensation for historic designation takings, the usual way of establishing landmarks may be ending.'" Typical "private property
rights" provisions either exempt property owners from regulations that reduce their property values significantly or require
the taking government to pay for what it has taken. If these
proposals become law, the sun will set on non-consensual historic designations. If they do not become law, it remains clear
that the mood of our nation and our courts is such that a more
palatable approach may be the best hope for those who guard
the relics of our past.
III.

MODO VINCIS, MODO VINCERIS:6 ' SUNSHINE AND TORT

LIABILITY

Zoning boards suffer from a sort of schizophrenia: on the one
hand they are judicial in nature, enjoying a certain level of judicial immunity, and on the other hand, they are frequently treated as political bodies that must answer to the public, holding
their quasi-judicial hearings and deliberations under a watchful
public eye. This schism is apparent in two recent decisions: first,
in a case before the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas
regarding the Sunshine Act; and second, in a ruling from the
commonwealth court dealing with the liability of zoning board
members for willful misconduct in the adjudication of a zoning
case. This vignette analyzes the two cases and their reasoning,

60. See, e.g., Jonathan Rinde, "Take Me, Take Me" Can There Be a Private
Property Rights Bill That Environmentalists Support?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 14, 1995, at 56.
61.

"Well, you win some, you lose some." HENRY BEARD, LATIN FOR ALL OCCA-

SIONS 18 (1990).
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illustrating that, as of now, zoning boards must continue to accept their roles as neither fish nor fowl.
A. Lex, Eyes and Videotape-Malczyk
Zoning Hearing Board

v. Slocum Township

This Luzerne County decision will be welcome news to those
persons who simply cannot get enough fast and furious zoning
board action. In Malczyk v. Slocum Township Zoning Hearing
2 the plaintiff, Stanley Harmon, wanted to videotape his
Board,"
zoning board hearing. 3 The Slocum Township Hearing Board
(the "Board") told Harmon that he was permitted to audiotape
the hearing but that videotaping was not allowed."
Judge Stevens of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas
considered Harmon's action in mandamus on the issue of whether the Sunshine Act (the "Act") permits videotaping of zoning
board hearings." The court held that a zoning board hearing is
a public meeting for purposes of the Act 8 and further held that
video cameras are a permitted "recording device." 7
The court was unpersuaded by the Board's argument that
Rules 27 and 328 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit videotaping proceedings because a zoning board is
"judicial" in nature.6 8 The court acknowledged that zoning

62. 85 Luz. Reg. Rep. 207 (C.P. Luz. Cty. 1995).
63. Makczyk, 85 Luz. Reg. Rep. at 208. Harmon wanted a special exception to
open a firearms shop. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 208-09. See The Sunshine Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 271-286
(Supp. 1995).
66. Malczyk, 85 Luz. Reg. Rep. at 209. Accord Harman v. Wetzel, 766 F.
Supp. 271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Appeal of Emmanuel Baptist Church, 364 A.2d 536,
539 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). Section 274 of the Act requires: "Official action and
deliberations by a quorum of the members of an agency shall take place at a meeting open to the public unless closed under Section 7, 8 or 12." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
65, § 274 (Supp. 1995).
67. Makczyk, 85 Luz. Reg. Rep. at 211. Section 281(a) of the Act provides:
§ 281. Use of equipment during meetings
(a) Recording devices.-Except as provided in subsection (b), a person
attending a meeting of an agency shall have the right to use recording
devices to record all the proceedings. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the agency from adopting and enforcing reasonable rules for their
use under section 10.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 281.
The court cited Hain v. Board of Sch. Directors, 641 A.2d 661, 664 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994), for the proposition that video cameras are recording devices
under the Act. Malczyk, 85 Luz. Reg. Rep. at 210.
68. Malczyk, 85 Luz. Reg. Rep. at 210-11. Rule 27(a)(2) provides in part that
the court shall "[plrohibit the mechanical recording of the proceedings by anyone for
any purpose." PA. R. CRIM. P. 27(a)(2). Rule 328 prohibits the taking of photographs

544

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 34:533

boards enjoy a kind of "judicial" immunity." Noting what it
called the "dual role" of zoning boards ("partly legislative and
quasi-judicial"), the court held that the Act expressly permits the
videotaping of zoning board proceedings.7"
While flirting with the dangerous, but perhaps overdue notion
that deliberations of a zoning hearing board may not necessarily
be covered by the Sunshine Act, the court distinguished open
hearings from deliberations.7' In any event, the practice of videotaping has been occurring with increasing frequency
throughout the Commonwealth, and the only thing for certain is
that board members will be treated to frequent instant replays
unless and until Pennsylvania appellate courts speak.
B. Immunity from Tort Liability-Delatev. Kolle
In Delate v. Kolle,72 the plaintiff, Thomas Delate, an attorney
acting pro se, sought damages for personal injuries from the
Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Makefield Township (the
"Board").7" Delate alleged that the Board engaged in willful
misconduct when it granted a special exception allowing the
Congregation Beth-El (the "Congregation") to build a synagogue.74 The Board's decision to grant the exception was affirmed
by the trial court, but was reversed by the commonwealth court
on appeal by objecting neighbors.75
Delate claimed that Board members accepted "fallacious"
evidence, based their decision on that "fallacious" evidence, deliberately refused to apply provisions of the zoning ordinance,
and used "obfuscation" in granting the variance.7" Delate
claimed that because of the Board members' actions, he was
required to spend hours and weeks of time preparing for the
hearings and their appeals, and was therefore entitled to damages in tort.77
or radio or television broadcasting from a courtroom or its environs. PA. R. CRiM. P.

328.
69. Malczyk, 86 Luz. Reg. Rep. at 210 (citing Urbana v. Meneses, 431 A.2d
308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)).
70. Id. at 210-11.
71. Id. at 211 (stating that "it may very well be that the deliberations of the
Board members in reaching a decision on a particular case are not necessarily covered by the Sunshine Act.").
72. 667 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
73. Delate, 667 A.2d at 1219.
74. Id. The Congregation acquired a variance for acreage and parking requirements. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1219-20.
77. Id. at 1220. Delate stated that he spent an excessive amount of time do-
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The Board raised the defense of governmental immunity under the Judicial Code.78 Delate, however, contended that the
Board acted with "willful misconduct" that would place the
Board members within the exception to governmental immuni79
ty.
The trial court entered summary judgment on behalf of the
Board members and the commonwealth court affirmed, stating
that the Board's legal error, without more, would not support a
finding of willful misconduct." The court cited Urbano v.
Meneses5 ' for the proposition that zoning hearing board members enjoy quasi-judicial immunity and that board members, as
well as members of the commonwealth court, would be subject to
suit whenever their decisions were overturned by a higher tribunal, if the instant case was decided otherwise.82
C. Political Hat or Judicial Robes?
Within the space of a few short months, zoning board members had their status elevated by the commonwealth court to a
level on par with that of courts, only to then face the cold reality
that in the eyes of many they are still politicians to be closely
watched. Whether this ambiguity is born of cynicism or of the
increasingly difficult role of zoning board members has not been
comprehensively revisited. It may be time to follow the lead of
the commonwealth court in Delate.
Ironically, "sunshine" frequently does not promote justice in
land use proceedings. Parties to local zoning hearings now bring
what is often unprecedented public pressure to bear on board
members, creating situations in which arriving at a just result is
far more difficult and less tempting than succumbing to the will

ing "research, analysis, drafting, typing, traveling, taking depositions, appearing in
court to appeal their decisions and orders, and performing other tasks." Id.
78. Delate, 667 A.2d at 1220. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-8559 (1982).
79. Delate, 667 A.2d at 1220. Section 8550 of the Judicial Code states:
In any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee in which it is judicially
determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act
constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct, the provisions of sections 8545 (relating to official liability generally), 8546 (relating
to defense of official immunity), 8548 (relating to indemnity) and 8549 (relating to limitations on damages) shall not apply.
42 PA. CON. STAT. § 8550.
80. Delate, 667 A.2d at 1220-21 (stating that "the mere failure to reach the
correct legal conclusion in a zoning case does not constitute the type of purposeful
misconduct which is necessary for a finding of willful misconduct.").
81. 431 A.2d 308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
82. Delate, 667 A.2d at 1221.
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of the crowd. Justice may be more readily attainable if, at the
very least, zoning boards are permitted to deliberate in private,
away from what is frequently the madding crowd. While this
runs contrary to the 1990's neo-empowerment of the people, the
natural extension of Delate may get us closer to a deliberate and
effective process in which zoning boards are free to make decisions based on the facts of each case.
IV. HAVEN'T WE MET BEFORE? CELLULAR PHONE ANTENNAS,
GROUP HOMES, AND AN INVITATION TO PRE-EMPTION

As you speed between suburban zoning boards on a cold and
lonely night, your cellular phone provides a comfortable connection to hearth and home-comfortable until your goodnight call
to the kids is repeatedly dropped because of spotty antenna
coverage. While you may be frustrated by the inconvenience,
poor coverage can result in far more serious consequences because security is now the principal reason for buying a cell
phone." The headlines credit cell phone users with the successful deliveries of babies in blizzards' and the foiling of bank
robbers."5 Bystanders with cell phones have reported exploding
tanker trucks, drunk drivers and stalkers to police.86
Headlines have also told the other side of the story; the side
that explains why some emergency cell calls do not get through
and why your kids sometimes go to bed without your gentle
words. "Planners Reject Cell Tower Near Homes,"87 "Cell Tower
up in the Air,"8 and "Ruckus Raised over Cell Towers,"89 are
typical newspaper responses to antenna applications.
Even the White House has encouraged the implementation of
these new technologies and the economic development they will
bring by facilitating access to federal property for the siting of
mobile services antennas.9" President Clinton has directed all
83.

Katie Hafner, Not Just for Big Shots, NEWSWEEK, April 3, 1995, at 50.

84.

See Lisa Gerrard, Burr-Winter Storm Welcomes 1-95 Baby, POTOMAC

NEWS, March 3, 1994, at Al.

85. Rick Rothacker, Mobile Callers are Becoming Eyes, Ears of Law, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 28, 1996, at B1.
86. Chana Schoenberger, The Pocket-Size Protector: Feeling Safe, Not Stylish,
With Cellular Phones, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1995, at B5.
87. Catherine Bridge, El Dorado County Planners Reject Cell Tower Near
Homes, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 3, 1995, at N7.
88. Carrie M. Shanny, Cell Tower Up In the Air, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Nov. 26, 1995, at NW3.
89. Karen Hayes, Ruckus Raised Over Towers Structures Fought in Pair of
Towns, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1995, at SWl.

90. Memorandum: FacilitatingAccess to Federal Property for the Siting of Mobile Services Antennas, Aug. 10, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 476250 [here-
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managers of federal property to develop clear and simple procedures to assure "the efficient and rapid buildout of the national wireless communications infrastructure."9
Obviously, wireless communications and the necessary antennas have become important for economic, technological and public safety purposes. In spite of this, every small town and village
has the power to blockade the on-ramps to the information highway through local zoning. Cell phone towers have become the
group homes of the 1990's and in different times would have
created an open invitation to the same type of legislative and
court-created pre-emption that has saved disabled citizens from
"Not in my backyard" attitudes.
The Fair Housing Act 92 prohibits housing discrimination
against the physically and mentally disabled. 3 In City of
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court held that the Fair Housing Act provides that single-family
zoning definitions cannot be used to exclude persons with disabilities. 5 On the day of the Court's decision, City of Edmonds
attorney W. Scott Snyder remarked: "The effect of the ruling will
be that most communities will simply get out of the business of
trying to regulate group homes in any way."96
In Pennsylvania, cell phone companies were similarly encouraged by the commonwealth court's 1992 decision in Hawk v.
Zoning Hearing Board.97 The court ruled that cell phone towers
could be treated as public utilities for zoning purposes without
being considered public utilities by the Public Utilities Commission.98 This is important because most zoning codes have a category or exemption for public utilities or essential services. It
was expected that cell phone towers would find a suitable home
in every municipality as a result of Hawk, but as group home
owners found previously, it was not that simple.
Two Allegheny County Common Pleas Court decisions put
these types of applications back at the mercy of local regulators
and disgruntled neighbors. In Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc.
inafter Memorandum].
91. Memorandum, supra note 91.
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
93. Id. §§ 3604-3606.
94. 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
95. Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1782.
96. Joan Biskupic, Court Acts in Housing Bias Dispute: Zoning Can't Be Used
to Exclude Group Homes for Disabled, Justices Say, WASH. POST, May 16, 1995, at
A3.
97. 618 A.2d 1087 (Pa. Connw. Ct. 1992), allocatur denied, 629 A.2d 1385
(Pa. 1993).
98. Hawk, 618 A.2d at 1090.
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v. Borough of Baldwin,9 9 and Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc.
v. Zoning Hearing Board ("Bell Atlantic IF,,),00 the court determined that, in spite of Hawk, local ordinances may contain public utility or essential services definitions that are not drafted
broadly enough to include cell phone towers. 1 This provides
municipalities with an incentive to tighten their definitions in
order to exclude "mobile domestic cellular radio telecommunications service," just as the Public Utilities Commission has
done.102

In Crown Communications v. Zoning Hearing Board,"3 the
court determined that the zoning definition was broad enough to
include a cell phone tower.' " The issue of whether Crown constituted a public utility was disposed of with a holding that a
lessor to public service corporations is sufficiently close to the
ordinance definition to qualify as a permitted use.' 5
In Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Zoning HearingBoard
("Bell Atlantic III"),1"6 the court permitted a tower as a special

exception, applying the Bray v. Zoning Board of Adjustment' 1
traditional test.'0 s
As the ordinance by ordinance analysis continues, municipalities will tighten their zoning definitions, the industry will prepare for a wave of exclusionary zoning challenges, practitioners
will gird themselves for Hawk redux and scholars will await
federal pre-emption and the definitive ruling a la Oxford House.
V. EXCLUSIONARY ZONING-THE SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Thanks to the Validity Challenge with Curative Amendment
provisions of the MPC'O° and numerous decisions of the commonwealth court, lawyers who spent hours poring over local
zoning codes in search of an obscure constitutional infirmity
were often richly rewarded with site-specific relief. It could be

99. 143 Pittsburgh Leg. J. 477 (C.P. Allegh. Cty. 1995).
100. 143 Pittsburgh Leg. J. 580 (C.P. Allegh. Cty. 1995).
101. Baldwin, 143 Pittsburgh Leg. J. at 478; Bell Atlantic I1,143 Pittsburgh
Leg. J. at 582.
102. See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (1979 & Supp. 1995).
103. S.A- 4159-94 (C.P. Allegh. Cty. 1995).
104. Crown, S.A. 4159-94, at 4-5.
105. Id. at 5.
106. S.A. 952-95 (C.P. Allegh. Cty. 1996).
107. 410 A.2d 909 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
108. Bell Atlantic III, S.A. 952-95, at 3-6.
109. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.1 (Supp. 1995) (outlining the procedure
for landowner curative amendments).
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an unwanted pizza shop,"' multiple family dwellings,"' or a
billboard.. that had fallen into the Locally Unwanted Land
Use ("LULU") category. Applicants, however, were entitled to
almost all that they requested once it was determined that a
local ordinance made no room for a legitimate business use in
the targeted municipality.
Zoning ordinances continue to enjoy a presumption of validity
and challengers face a heavy burden when trying to show unconstitutionality."' However, once it has been demonstrated that
an exclusion is not justified by health, safety and welfare concerns of the municipality, the challenger has been entitled to
site-specific relief."4 If municipalities were permitted to zone
around challengers after a constitutional infirmity is discovered,
thus denying the challenger meaningful relief, there would be no
incentive to expend the time and expense necessary to have a
zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional. " ' As Justice Nix
stated in a concurring opinion in Fernley: "[T]he township or
municipality must ultimately adopt the underlying development
plan. Not only does such policy guard against any possible retaliation against the litigant who opposed the zoning board, but it
also serves to deter the passage of unconstitutional zoning ordinances.""' While the vibrancy provided by the MPC and case
law has not been unbridled, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has stated that an applicant who has successfully identified a
constitutional infirmity in a zoning ordinance "should not be
frustrated in his quest for relief by a retributory township."" 7
Site specific relief has been subject to reasonable regulations
and restrictions, including the zoning and building code requirements necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the
public."' But these restrictions have been limited to regulations "generally applicable to the class of use or construction" of
the development for which approval is being sought.""

110. See Lamanti's Pizza v. Edgewood, 556 A.2d 22 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
111. See Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 502 A.2d 585 (Pa. 1985).
112. See Borough of Dickson City v. Patrick Outdoor Media, 496 A.2d 427 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985).
113. See, e.g., In re Miller, 444 A.2d 786 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
114. See, e.g., Casey v. Zoning Board, 328 A.2d 464, 469 (Pa. 1974); see also
Fernley, 502 A.2d at 591 (listing factors that must be shown in order for a municipality to appropriately deny adoption of the proposed development plan).
115. See, e.g., Casey, 328 A.2d at 468.
116. Fernley, 502 A.2d at 592 (Nix, C.J., concurring).
117. Casey, 328 A.2d at 468.
118. Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 333 A.2d 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). See
also Fernley, 502 A.2d at 591.
119. Fernley, 502 A.2d at 585.
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In spite of this history of pro-challenger rulings, a recent commonwealth court decision in a suburban billboard case may give
municipalities some cause for hope. After J.B. Steven, Inc. v.
Board of Commissioners,"20 applicants may decide to think
twice before engaging in the costly and time consuming validity
challenge process. Steven successfully challenged a township
zoning ordinance as exclusionary to billboards but the controversy continued in the court because of a dispute over the nature of
the site-specific relief to which it was entitled.' Specifically,
the parties continued to disagree about the size and height of
the billboard that would
be permitted as a result of Stevens'
122
successful challenge.

The Township ordinance included dimensional restrictions
that are typical for on-site business signage and insisted that
Steven limit its off-site billboard accordingly. Steven insisted
that it was entitled to have larger signs consistent with what it
described as the industry standard. 2 The stage was set.
Would Steven's successful constitutional challenge go unrewarded? Would the Township be permitted to root around in its zoning ordinance to find yet another way to frustrate the challenger? Would meaningful victory now elude those applicants who
strive valiantly to bring constitutional relevance to the local land
use schemes of Pennsylvania municipalities? The answer, while
a seemingly subtle shift on its face, may be just enough to discourage costly challenges by those applicants who encounter an
exclusionary zoning code.
Embracing the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas
decision that upheld the Township's position, the commonwealth
court adopted the language and findings of the court below at
some critical junctures.' Specifically, the court stated that
regulations applicable to freestanding vertical signs generally
should also apply to off-site billboards. 2 ' Furthermore, the
court stated that "the right of the developer to site specific relief
is not so great as to justify penalizing the municipality by eliminating all restraints on the proposed development."'26 Finally,
the court found that the business sign regulations found elsewhere in the zoning ordinance did not impose any unreasonable

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

654 A.2d 135 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995),
J.B. Steven, 654 A.2d at 136-37.
Id.
Id. at 138-39.
Id
Id. at 137-38.
J.B. Steven, 654 A.2d at 137-38 (citations omitted).
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27
or burdensome restraints on Steven.
Even a footnote by the Honorable Samuel L. Rogers in a previous commonwealth court opinion dealing with a mandamus
action in this matter could not carry the day for those champions of constitutional integrity. 128 On the specific issue of applying the business sign restrictions of the code to the billboard proposal after the ordinance was found to be exclusionary, Judge
Rogers stated that the on-site advertising sign restrictions could
not be enforced against Steven because "these on-site sign provisions are not general zoning restrictions."'2 9
In the zoning appeal, Judge Bernard L. McGinley agreed with
Judge Rogers on this point, but allowed the application of the
on-site restrictions anyway because the Township "did more
than simply engraft the restrictions."' He went on to state
that "Ithe Board has proposed a curative amendment. If this
proposed curative amendment is adopted these restrictions will
apply to off-site billboards." 3' The impact of this on the future
of validity challenges is unknown. As applicants' lawyers search
for exclusionary zoning codes that could open doors for unpopular uses, municipal solicitors may find some small comfort in
what could be an early sign of a shift back in the direction of
municipal governments.

CONCLUSION

Viewed individually, these recent developments in land use
law are fascinating only to practitioners, planners and land use
administrators. When viewed together against the backdrop of
our political times, however, they tell a story that goes beyond
the Republican Revolution. In fact, it may be that local government is the only level of government that is still relevant to the
general citizenry. Local government provides basic services-snow removal, garbage collection, public safety, and land
use regulation. It appears that some degree of control of these
purely local services is being returned to the local level. The
satisfaction and trust of those being served is not guaranteed.
While citizens armed with video cameras roam the halls of government, no single political party will benefit for long, and the
future of government may be determined on the battlefields of
127.
128.
146 n.4
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 138.
Id. at 138 n.2 (citing J.B. Steven, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 643 A.2d 142,
(Pa. Commw. Ct.), allocatur denied, 652 A.2d 841 (Pa. 1994)).
J.B. Steven, 643 A.2d at 146 n.4.
J.B. Steven, 654 A.2d at 138 n.2.
Id.
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town councils, zoning boards and planning commissions.
For all its talk about "restoring bonds of trust between the
people and their elected representatives,"132 does the Contract
with America go far enough? Are the advocates of the contract
prepared to go where this conservative swing of the pendulum
takes them? Is local government ready for the new found power,
and scrutiny, that will surely accompany this return of power to
the people?

132.

Contract with America, supra note 1, at A20.

